## Decentralized Finance II

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
Columbia University

Course website: https://verigu.github.io/6998Fall2024/

## NO Financial Advice!!!

# Oracles

#### Synthetic Stablecoins — Stabilization



The stability fee and DSR are raised when DAI is trading below \$1 (to discourage borrowing and encourage DAI holding), and lowered when DAI is trading above \$1

#### Background

A blockchain cannot access data outside of its state (e.g. ETHUSD price, the weather today, content at a URL, etc.)

Complex use cases require non-native data

- Finance: prices, insurance
- Random number generation
- Blockchain interoperability: bitcoin headers on Ethereum
- IoT: temperature, geolocation data etc.

How do you import non-native data to a blockchain? Oracles!

#### **Price Oracles in DeFi**

#### Stablecoins and synthetics

- Liquidations
- Interest rates
- Redemptions

Lending

Derivatives


```
contract Oracle {
  address oracle;
  uint256 public ethusd;
  constructor() {
      oracle = msg.sender;
  function update(uint256 ethusd) external {
      require(msg.sender == oracle, "auth error");
      ethusd = ethusd;
```

### **Trusted Signer**



Corrupt signer can manipulate!

#### **M of N Oracles**




In general, uses a consensus protocol to resolve discrepancies

If 3 of 5 have published a value, take the median (here: \$300)

Vulnerable against collusion


#### **M of N Oracles**



= \$300

Use a value supported by the most stake and slash everyone who voted differently (by a lot)

#### **M of N Oracles**




#### **On-chain Oracles**

For on-chain assets, we can use DEXes (auctions, orderbooks, or AMMs) as price oracles!

Sandwich attacks!

#### Uniswap — time weighted average




### Recap: mapping the oracle design space

|                 | Decentralized | Freq/Accuracy | Corruption cost |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
| 1 signer        | Low           | High          | Low             |
| M of N signer   | Medium        | High          | Medium          |
| On-chain oracle | High          | High          | Low             |
| Uniswap TWAP    | High          | Configurable  | High            |

# DeFi Lending Systems

#### The role of banks




Bank spread (borrow interest - deposit interest)

#### The role of banks



Bank spread (borrow interest - deposit interest)

#### The Role of Crypto CeFi Lending




#### The Role of Crypto CeFi Lending

CeFi's concern: what if Bob defaults on loan?

Solution: require user to lock up collateral

lender needs to liquidate before value(debt) > value(collateral)



#### Why Borrow ETH?

If Bob has collateral, why can't he just buy ETH?

- Bob may need ETH (e.g., to buy in-game Axies),
   but he might not want to sell his collateral (e.g., an NFT)
- As an investment strategy: using UNI to borrow ETH gives Bob exposure to both

#### The problem with CeFi lending

#### Users must trust the CeFi institution:

- Not to get hacked, steal assets, or miscalculate
- This is why traditional finance is regulated

Interest payments go to the exchange, not liquidity provider


CeFi fully controls spread (borrow interest – deposit interest)

#### DeFi Lending

#### Can we build an on-chain lending Dapp?

- no central trusted parties
- code available on Ethereum for inspection

#### A first idea: an order book Dapp



#### **Problems**

#### Computationally expensive:

matching borrowers to lenders requires many transactions per person


#### **Concentrated risk:**

lenders are exposed to their direct counterparty defaulting

#### **Complex withdrawal:**

a lender must wait for their counter-parties to repay their debts

### A better approach: liquidity pools




#### **Example: Compound cTokens**



Value of X, Y, Z is determined by an exchange rate

#### **Example: Compound cTokens**




Bob's accrued interest increases ETH/cETH exchange rate

=> benefit cETH token holders (ETH liquidity providers)

#### Liquidation risk

Demand for DAI spikes

- => price of DAI spikes
- => user's debt shoots up
- => liquidation




To use Compound, borrowers must constantly monitor APY and repay loans if APY goes too high

## 3 Flash Loan

#### What is a flash loan?

A flash loan is taken and repaid in a single transaction

- => Zero risk for lender
- => Borrower needs no collateral



Tx is valid only if funds are returned in the same Tx

#### **Use cases**

Risk free arbitrage


Collateral swap

DeFi attacks: price oracle manipulation

. . .

#### Risk free arbitrage

#### Bob finds a USDC/DAI price difference in two pools



Bob keeps 0.001M USDC

All in a single transaction!

#### **Aave v1 implementation**

```
function flashLoan(address _receiver, uint256 _amount) {
... // transfer funds to the receiver
core.transferToUser(_reserve, userPayable, _amount);
// execute action of the receiver
receiver.executeOperation(_reserve, _amount, amountFee, _params);
... // abort if loan is not repaid
require(availableLiquidityAfter == availableLiquidityBefore.add(amountFee),
        "balance inconsistent");
```

#### **Use cases**

Risk free arbitrage

Collateral swap

DeFi attacks: price oracle manipulation

. . .

# DAO

#### Decentralized orgs (DAO)

#### What is a DAO?

- A Dapp deployed on-chain at a specific address
- Anyone (globally) can send funds to DAO treasury
- Anyone can submit a proposal to DAO
  - → participants vote

#### Decentralized orgs (DAO)

Creating a DAO is quite simple cheaper than creating a real-world U.S. partnership

#### **Example DAOs**:


- PleasrDAO: invests in NFTs
- Gitcoin: DAO to fund open source projects
- Investment DAOs: many

# 5 DEX

#### What is an exchange?

An exchange: users to convert one token to another (e.g., USDC -> ETH)

- What is the exchange rate?
- How to connect sellers and buyers?



#### **Problems**

How is exchange rate determined?

- By supply and demand at the exchange (not transparent)
- Competition with other exchanges (bad user experience)

Security: What if exch. takes Bob's 2 ETH, but never sends USDC?

Censorship: What if exchange refuses to do business with Bob?

#### A more trusted solution: DEX

#### What is a DEX?

 a marketplace where transactions occur directly between participants, without a trusted intermediary

#### **Properties:**

- Programmable: can be used as a service by other contracts
- Transparent: code is available for everyone to see
- Permission-less: anyone can use
- Non-Custodial

#### How to build a DeX?

First idea: on-chain order book

- Liquidity providers place buy/sell orders on chain
- Users fill them on chain

Problem: gas inefficient

- Orders cost gas: when placed, when filled, when canceled.
- Matching buy orders to sell orders takes lots of gas

#### How to build a DeX?

Next idea: off-chain order book

- Liquidity providers sign buy/sell orders off chain
  - Post orders on a centralized web site
- User signs an order it wants to fill and submits it on chain.
- Examples: Ox Protocol, OpenSea

Problem: order book is not accessible to contracts (dAPPs)

#### How to build a DeX?

#### Next next idea: Automated Market Maker (AMM)

- Liquidity providers deposit assets into an on-chain pool
- Users trade with the on-chain pool
  - exchange rate is determined algorithmically
- Examples: Uniswap, Balancer, Bancor

Benefits: Gas-efficient, accessible to contracts, easy to bootstrap

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### Discussion Session

How to build a product?

